De plus j ai discute avec un expat, qui passe très souvent à Bangkok, qui m'expliquait qu'il n'y avait aucune raison de s'alarmer. Ce que j ai pu verifier.
En effet, un évènement est prévu sur Bangkok le 13. Les thai avec qui je suis, disent en effet le mouvement pourrait prendre de l'ampleur.
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Il est regrettable effectivement de voir cette prolifération de postes gravitant autour du même sujet, la situation sécuritaire à Bangkok et plus généralement en Thaïlande. Cependant, je ne vois plus en tête de liste les postes intéressants que je suivais sur ce sujet il y a une dizaine de jours, donc je reprends sur celui-ci.
Personne ne peut prédire ce qui va se passer mais la concentration d’ingrédients pour que cela dégénère augmente nettement. Ce qui est sûr, c’est que lundi 13 janvier va être une journée mouvementée à Bangkok, même si tout se passe dans le calme, car blocage de 20 points stratégiques (liste des sites choisis dans le texte en Anglais plus bas). Par exemple, il sera difficile sinon impossible de trouver un taxi pour se déplacer dans le centre de Bangkok.
Je cite en entier un article tout frais publié par l’agence internationale IHS (spécialités : énergie, environnement, presse, électronique, IT etc). Traduction libre, en bref et entre autres (passages en gras dans le texte en Anglais) :
« L’importance stratégique des sites choisis pour les manifestations du 13 janvier garantissent des déploiements policiers importants, augmentant ainsi la probabilité de confrontation violentes….
… augmentant ainsi le risque d’un coup militaire.
(L’objectif déclaré de ces opérations est de) bloquer au maximum la capitale et de gêner autant que possible le train de vie normal pour forcer le PM Yingluck Shinawatra de démissionner et passer le pouvoir à un « Conseil du Peuple »…
La stratégie de l’opposition serait de déstabiliser le gouvernement et d’empêcher les élections autant que possible, justifiant ainsi un coup militaire.
…. Les protestataires ne viseront probablement pas les stations de métro ni les aéroports.
La chance (pour l’opposition) de déposer le gouvernement actuel et de le remplacer par un « Conseil du Peuple », et d’éviter les élections (que l’opposition ne peut pas gagner) repose sur un coup militaire. L’opposition a donc tout intérêt à l’escalade pour mener à un coup… Dans ce contexte, une source « sur le terrain » confirme que des paramilitaires … se trouvent au milieu des manifestants.
… Il y a des éléments parmi les forces de l’ordre qui sont visiblement frustrés par ce qu’ils considèrent comme une attitude conciliatoire de la part du gouvernement, vis-à-vis des manifestants, et qui voudraient employer plus de force pour répondre aux manifestations.
…. Il est probable que les manifestations du 13 janvier causent plus de violence que ce qui a été le cas le 26 décembre (1 mort, 143 blessés).
… toute tentative de coup causera probablement plus de violence (du fait d’une réaction plus forte de la part des « Red Shirts ») que ce qui a été vu en 2010 quand ces groupes (les « Red Shirts ») avaient protesté contre le gouvernement d’Abhisit Vejjajiva. Cela expliquerait la réticence de l’armée d’intervenir (jusqu’à présent).
Bref, le message clé de cet article est que:
- le 13 sera mouvementé
- il y a de fortes chances que la situation mène à un coup militaire et à plus de violence que dans les événements similaires des dernières années.
Si cela se produisait comme tel, les autres questions seraient « quand ? », « pendant combien de temps ? » et « à quels niveaux de violence et d’insécurité ? », mais là c’est vraiment du domaine de Madame Soleil.
http://connect.ihs.com/...ctPath%3DLandingPagePlanned opposition protests in Thailand likely to turn violent and increase risk of military coup
8 Jan 2014 - IHS Global Insight
The opposition's move to shut down central Bangkok from 13 January at 20 major intersections represents an escalation of ongoing anti-government protests. The strategic significance of the protest sites ensures that police will be deployed in full force, thereby increasing the likelihood of violent confrontations between police and protesters.
The continued escalation of anti-government street protests will undermine the holding of elections, which are currently scheduled for 2 February.
The expansion of the anti-government protests into Bangkok's financial and tourism districts ensures that the police are likely to be deployed in full force at these sites. The protests are likely to escalate into violence and there is an increased risk of fighting breaking out between police and anti-government protesters, thereby increasing the risks of a military coup.
A military coup would trigger significant counter-protests by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) 'Red Shirts'. The military is therefore likely to intervene if and when violence escalates to the point where it can be justifiably argued that the caretaker Pheu Thai party government has lost control of the country.
The leader of the People's Opposition Reform Committee (PDRC), Suthep Thaugsuban, announced on 1 January that the PDRC would lead 'Yellow Shirt' anti-government protesters to occupy 20 major intersections across the Thai capital Bangkok from 13 January, in an attempt to paralyse traffic within those areas. The 20 protest locations are: Asok; Bang Rak; Charoenpol; Din Daeng; Hua Lamphong; Klong Toey; Lat Phrao five-way intersection; Lumpini; Petchaburi; Phaya Thai; Pratunam; Ratchadamnoen; Ratchaprasong; Ratchathewi; Sam Yan; Siam Square; Silom; Uruphong; Victory Monument; and Yaowarat.
Silom and Siam are Bangkok's main tourism and financial districts. Accordingly, the move into these areas represents a significant escalation of the anti-government protests, which are aimed at shutting down the capital and disrupting daily life as far as possible, to force caretaker prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra to resign and hand power to an unelected "people's council". Although snap elections have been scheduled for 2 February, they have been boycotted by the opposition, which has stated that an election in the absence of political reforms would only return to power what it deems the "Thaksin regime" , in reference to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. IHS assesses that the opposition’s strategy is to destabilise Yingluck's government and to derail elections as far as possible, therefore triggering a military coup. However, the opposition has denied that this is the case, although it has openly stated that it will not rest until the current government is removed.
An IHS source who regularly reports on the political situation in Bangkok confirms that the anti-government protesters are unlikely to target commercial buildings at present. The anti-government protests are, therefore, currently unlikely to descend to levels of violence witnessed in 2010, when protesting Red Shirts launched grenade attacks and burnt down landmark commercial buildings in downtown Bangkok. In addition, although opposition protesters will close down major roads, they are unlikely to target metro stations or airports for now. The reason for this is that the leaders of the yellow shirt protesters, the People's Alliance of Democracy (PAD), were ordered in March 2011 to pay damages amounting to USD17 million in connection with their occupation of Bangkok's airports in 2008.
Nevertheless, the opposition has decided to boycott the snap elections called by the Pheu Thai party government, which are currently scheduled for 2 February 2014. Its ability to successfully remove the incumbent Pheu Thai government and replace it with an unelected "people's council" in place of elections therefore depends on the military moving in to stage a coup. Opposition protesters therefore have the incentive to escalate protests as far as they can, to trigger a military intervention. In this connection, another IHS source who closely monitors Bangkok's political scene confirmed that some trained paramilitaries, whose function is to guard protest leaders, are currently among the crowd of opposition protesters.
Given that police are also likely to erect barricades and deploy greater numbers of troops to maintain order at protest sites, there is an increased risk of fighting breaking out between police and protesters if protest leaders lose control over crowds, or if protesters carry out threats to cut power to government buildings. As elements within the protest camp are likely to be armed, potentially with small-arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), there is an increased risk that confrontations at rally sites will result in casualties, injuries, and collateral damage to businesses and retail property in the vicinity. Police are likely to use tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannon in the event of any violence.
Although law enforcement personnel have so far exercised significant restraint in dealing with protesters, this is unlikely to hold given the strategic importance of the new protest sites. IHS sources confirm that there are elements within law enforcement that are visibly angry about what they perceive to be a conciliatory response on the government's part, and would like to see greater force used to maintain order and to disperse the protesters. In this regard, 500 police officers staged their own rally on 6 January, to vent their frustration at being unable or ill-equipped to defend themselves when confronting protesters. Accordingly, it is likely that the anti-government protests starting on 13 January are likely to result in similar levels of violence to that seen at the Thai-Japanese stadium on 26 December 2013, which resulted in one death and 143 injuries.
The risks of the military staging a coup will increase if violence escalates. Given that the militancy of the pro-government Red Shirts has increased since 2006, any attempted coup would lead to scores of Red Shirt protesters mobilising in Bangkok, triggering violence likely to surpass levels witnessed in 2010 when these groups launched protests in Bangkok against former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government. This explains the military's reticence to intervene in the conflict so far. However, the military is likely to intervene should the protests escalate to such levels of violence where the intervention can be justified on the grounds that the government has lost control over the country, and the intervention was the only option available for restoring order. This will in turn depend on how the anti-government protests escalate and whether law enforcement continues to exercise restraint in responding to the protests.
